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Abstract 
 
Using the work – leisure choice model, this paper computes equilibrium 
hours-worked for a number of Arab, non-oil-producing and labor-abundant 
countries and major oil-producing, tax-free and labor-scarce countries, for 
which actual data are unavailable.  We estimate hours-worked for the G7, and 
show that the model fits the data well.  We use this evidence as a yardstick to 
evaluate the model for the Arab countries for which no actual data are 
available.  The model explains hours-worked in Arab, non-oil-producing 
countries well, but it fails to explain hours-worked in the oil-producing – tax-
free countries.  With the effective marginal tax rate close to zero, hours-
worked increase significantly.  We show that natural resource endowment is a 
required predicting factor for the model in this case.  It turned out that natural 
resource capital acts exactly as a tax. In other words, it increases the wedge 
between real wages and marginal productivity, hence, natural resource 
wedge.  The higher the natural resource endowment the less hours people 
worked.  Most importantly, we provide a wider support to the model and 
confirm that the labor supply is elastic in all Arab countries. This finding 
confirms previous research that workers respond to incentives, which has 
serious implications for tax and social security policies.  We also provide 
some policy simulation pertinent to poverty and welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Our primary objective is to provide information about the labor market such as 
hours-worked, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and labor productivity in a 
number of Arab countries.  Without such information the discussions about 
labor, fiscal, social security, welfare and poverty policies, among others, 
would be misguided.  
 
We focus on the macroeconomic implications of policy issues.  Data limitation 
dictates research methodology.  We calibrate a theoretical model, namely, the  
work – leisure choice model, which Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004) and 
Shimer (2009) demonstrated its goodness of fit to G7 data.i This is a simple 
and informative model, where the Arabic data of the main predicting factors 
are available, albeit with dubious qualities.    
 
The main challenges are that data on hours-worked for the Arab countries are 
not available, which makes assessment of the goodness of fit of the model 
difficult.  And, some of the Arab countries, namely the Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries (GCC) oil and gas producers are almost tax-free 
economies.  With the effective marginal tax rate close to zero, the model 
predicts a very high, nonsensical, labor supply.  
 
To deal with these challenges we fit the model to the G7 data and use that as 
a yardstick to assess the goodness of fit of the model to the Arab countries.  
For the group of the oil-producing countries, we introduce natural resource 
endowment, into the model.  It turned out that the natural resource capital 
creates a wedge between real wages and the marginal product of labor 
similar to the tax or labor wedge.  The increase in the share of natural 
resource reduces hours-worked. It discourages work and reduces labor 
supply because rent-seeking activity increases with relatively high 
hydrocarbon revenues. 
 
The GCC countries are rent-economies, Noland and Pack (2007).  When 
hydrocarbon revenues as a percent of GDP increase because of the increase 
in energy prices, oil-rich governments run expansionary fiscal policies, and 
distribute rent in proportion to revenues.  Handouts of goodies take several 
different forms such as contracts, concessions to friendly domestic and 
foreign businesses and speculators, bureaucratic jobs and higher wages to 
citizens, most of them don't even show up for work.  On average, equilibrium 
hours-worked is expected to be lower in the state of the world, where 
hydrocarbon revenues are high.  And when energy prices drop, hydrocarbon 
revenues decline and the rent shrinks, which motivate households to work 
longer hours to compensate for the loss of income from rent, and to smooth 
consumption, hence a higher equilibrium hours-worked. These are the 
manifestations of the resource curse in the labor market.  For the resource 
curse see for example, Sachs and Warner (1997), Leite and Weidmann 
(1999), Caselli and Michaels (2009).  
 
We make a number of contributions.  First we compute hours-worked for five 
Arab non-oil producers (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia)
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and for seven oil-producers (Algeria plus the Gulf Cooperating Council group 
– the GCC – of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).  This allows us to compute 
and analyze the Frisch elasticity of the labor supply, which plays a major role 
in policy design.  And, also allows us to shed light on productivity in the Arab 
countries relative to the G7.  Second, we are unaware of any published article 
on the work – leisure model with a natural resource endowment.  We modify 
the model and show that such endowment works just like a tax on labor 
supply.  Third, we confirm the validity of the work-leisure intertemporal – 
intratemporal substitution model using Arab countries' data.  A theory is most 
valid if it fits different data at different times. So far, the bulk of the evidence 
for the work – leisure model relies on data from developed countries.  We 
show that Arab countries' labor supply curves are just like the G7, also elastic, 
which has important policy implications.ii  Non oil-producing Arab countries 
work long hours, but their relative productivities are low, thus they are 
relatively poorer.  Oil-producing countries work much less.   So the relatively 
less fortunate Arab countries work hard while the oil-rich countries are hardly 
working, especially when oil revenues are high.   
 
Finally, we solve the model stochastically and produce baseline projections of 
future labor supply for the Arab countries.  Then we conduct policy scenarios.  
First, for the GCC countries we ask how much is the change in welfare if the 
GCC countries embark on a diversification policy, which reduces the reliance 
on oil as the main source of income?  We find very significant increases in the 
lifetime consumption equivalent.  Second, we ask how much is the change in 
welfare due to the introduction of a permanent consumption tax?  Finally, how 
long it will take to eliminate poverty if a policy to reduce the tax rate on 
household is adopted in non oil-producing countries?  We find that a small 
permanent tax cut can reduce poverty by more than half in about 12 years. 
  
The model is presented next. In section 3 we produce and discus the results. 
Section 4 includes policy simulations. Section 5 is a conclusion. 
 
2. The Model 
 
We begin with  the model found in Prescott (2004) to derive the labor supply.iii  
A similar model is presented in Nickell (2003) and Shimer (2009).   Then we 
modify the model to include natural resource endowment. 
 
The utility function of a stand in household who faces a work – leisure 
decision is give by: 
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The utility function depends on the expected discounted sum of consumption 
and leisure, where 100 is the number of hours available for individuals to 
work in a week and h is hours work in “market activities”. The expectations 
operator 
c
E does not necessarily mean rational expectations, and 10 << β is 
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the discount factor specifies the degree of patience.  A high value means 
more patience for consumption and leisure.  The parameter α is and 
denotes the value of the non-market productive time for household.  Maybe it 
is the relative value of the time spent in working at home.  Typically, it is the 
relative value of leisure. The production using this time is untaxed.   The utility 
function includes one consumption good as in Christaino and Eichenbaum 
(1992).   We find no contradiction of such assumption with reality in the Arab 
countries.   
0>
 
The stock of capital evolves according to: 
 
ttt xkk +−=+ )1(2 1 δ  
 
Where is the stock of capital and is gross investments.  The depreciation 
rate is 
k tx
δ . 
 
There is a stand-in firm with a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale 
technology of production: 
 
θθ −= 13 ttitt hkAy ttt gxc ++≥ , where is government expenditures. g
 
Total factor productivity is exogenous given by , where is country 
.
itA i
ni L,2,1= iv  The parameter 10 <<θ is the share of capital.   
 
It is argued that the technical progress is exogenous because it plays no role 
in the inference being drawn.  
 
The household’s date t  budget constraint is: 
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Where is the real wage, w r is the real interest rate or rental capital, and T is 
transfer payment. The tax rates of consumption, investments, labor, and 
capital are given byτ with the subscripts c , x , , denote consumption, 
investments and capital respectively.  
h k
 
There is a literature on the methods of estimating average marginal income 
tax rates in the US, where differences seem significant.  Differences in the 
computation of income tax rates could affect the tax rateτ  in model. For more 
on the debate, see Barro (1979), Seater (1982), Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 
1986), Stephenson (1998), and Akhand and Liu (2002).  
 
Prescott (2004) derives the tax rate in the model theoretically.  See appendix 
2 for details.  He derives an aggregate effective marginal tax rate on labor 
income using both the tax rate on consumption cτ and on labor hτ .  It is the 
fraction of additional labor income that is taken in the form of taxes, holding 
investments fixed.   
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It is also important to note that the marginal and the average labor income 
taxes are very different.   All tax revenues, except for that used to finance the 
pure public consumption, is given back to households as lump-sum transfer 
payments (independent of the household's income).  Note that the model 
economy's consumption in the utility function above is cmil ITGGCc −−+= , 
where is public consumption and is military spending.  And the model 
economy's output in the production function is 
G milG
ITGDPy −= .   
 
In the Arab countries, public consumption is large, and so is the subsidy.  In 
some Arab countries, only total amount of subsidy is reported, which is the 
sum of production and consumption goods subsidy. We had to make an 
assumption on splitting them.  The data appendix includes more information. 
From the above we get the F.O.C., then the marginal rate of substitution  
equal to the price ratios: 
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And from the production function, the marginal product of labor is equal to the 
real wage rate: 
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The equilibrium labor supply is solved for from the two FOC above,  
 
itit
it
it
y
c
h
τ
αθ
θ
−+−
−=
1
)1(
18  
 
The subscript denote country and the subscript denotes time.  The 
parameters which do not have subscripts will be calculated as the average 
across the countries in the sample, and fixed throughout unless stated 
otherwise.   For example every country will have a fixed value of 
t
θ  in equation 
8 equal to the average of θ  across the countries. The intertemporal 
substitution is captured by the ratio of consumption to GDP in equation 8.  
The intratemporal substation is captured by the tax rate in equation 8.  If the 
effective tax rate on labor income is expected to be lower in the future, for 
example, people will increase their current consumption.  
 
2.1 introducing natural resource endowment effect 
 
For the GCC countries and Algeria, the theory predicts that a low tax rate τ  
increases hours work.  If we fit the model for the GCC, hours-worked will be 
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very high, higher than the US and Japan. To ameliorate this problem we 
modify the model by introducing oil endowment.   
 
Let the "effective" stock of capital be , and , where is an 
amplification factor, is natural resource capital and 
*
tk kNmkt )(
* = m
N K is the stock of capital.  
We assume that , where is the stock reserves of both oil and 
gas. The production function becomes: 
θω
ttt kNk =* N
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Solving the model the same way results: 
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We call it , where the superscript refers to natural resources.  The share 
of hydrocarbon in output is
Nh N
ω .  For ω >0 this formula predicts that <h in 
equation (8).  For 
Nh
ω =1, <0 and forNh ω =0, is identical to .    Nh h
 
3. Calibration 
 
The data are fully described in the appendix.  Note that our data are 
measured in PPP term so they are larger in magnitudes than actual data.  The 
data for the Arab countries have dubious quality.  One problem is missing 
data.  We use averages over the period 1999 to 2006 to calibrate the model, 
but for some countries the averages are for less than the full sample.  
Consumption data are also dodgy. These are residuals of the equation of 
exchange or the income identity.  
 
Table 1 includes our estimates of hours-worked for the G7 for the period 2000 
to 2008.  The fit of the G7 is our yardstick for the goodness of fit of the model 
for the Arab countries because Arab countries do not report hours-worked. 
 
The countries are listed in the first column.  The second column reports actual 
hours-worked.  We fix the value of α , the relative value of leisure, to the 
average of the G7, and to get the best fit.  For our sampleα  is 1.78.  We also 
took the average share of capital θ  to be 0.38.  We computed the share of 
capital from National Income Accounts, as gross operating surplus / GDP 
ratio.  The predicted hours-worked are reported in the third column. The fourth 
column reports the difference between the actual and the estimated values.  
The model fits Canada, Italy, and Japan best; slightly over-predicting in the 
case of Canada, and slightly under-predicting in the cases of Italy and Japan.  
On average, however, the fit is fine with a difference of 0.06 only.  The G7 
average weekly hours-worked per person is about 23. 
 
The fit can be made tighter when we allow α  to vary across countries.  We 
report the different values forα  in table 1.  Allowing α to vary across the G7 
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countries shows that the Italy has a value of α right on the average of 1.78.  
Three countries Canada, the UK, and the US have a value of α equal 1.6, 
which is below the G7 average.  The non-English speaking countries France, 
Germany and Japan have a value of α higher than 2.  The relative value of 
leisure is much higher in the non-English speaking G7 countries. 
 
Now we can turn to estimating hours-worked for the Arab non-oil producing 
and labor abundant countries.  We compute the tax rate the same way we 
calculated them for the G7, and as we explained in the appendix.  Note that 
there are no time series data for the marginal tax rates for Arab countries. We 
also conduct a sensitivity analysis. The share of capital, θ is fixed to the 
average of the Arab countries at 0.48.  For the Arab countries we try α  of 
1.78.   
 
We have no actual data for the Arab countries, but the prediction of the model 
seems sensible.  The average weekly hours-worked per person is 19.87, 
which is lower from the G7 average of 23.4.  Beginning with most obvious, the 
Syrians work much more than all other countries (26.1hours) because they 
pay the lowest tax rate among Arabs and their average propensity to 
consume is less than average G7.  Egypt's estimate of hours-worked is less 
than Jordan's even though the Jordanians have a higher tax rate than the 
Egyptians. This is because the consumption – output ratios are quite different. 
The Egyptians consumption to output ratio is 0.98 while Jordan is 0.79.  
Egypt's consumption to output ratio exceeds the G7 average by far. All Arab 
non oil-producing countries have a high consumption to output ratio, far 
exceeding the developed countries in PPP terms. The North African nations, 
Tunisia and Morocco work less than the Syrians and the Jordanians because 
they pay relatively more taxes than other Arabs.  Morocco and Tunisia's 
average weekly hours – worked are approximately 17.   
 
The results in table 1 confirm the literature's findings that when people are 
taxed the same rate they, they most probably supply the same amount of 
labor, everything else is the same.  Taxes affects labor supply decision in the 
Arab countries.   
 
Our estimates of the Frisch elasticity in table 1 suggest that the labor supply 
curves for the Arab countries are elastic, more so in Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia.  These Frisch elasticity estimates support the literature's.  Fairly 
elastic labor supplies spares countries the trouble of facing the cruel choice of 
either increasing taxes on the young, thereby reducing their welfare, or not 
honoring the promise made to the old making them worse off.  One thing large 
labor supply elasticity means is that as population age, promises of payment 
to the current and future old people cannot be financed by increasing taxes. 
 
Our estimates of the labor supply can explain why the non-oil producing Arab 
countries have low productivity.  There should be no problem with working 
less hours if efficiency and productivity are high.  However, this is not the case 
for the Arab countries.  Table 2 reports the decomposition of income per 
working age population relative to the average G7, GDP per working age 
population is decomposed to: GDP per hour and hours per working age 
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population, i.e., labor productivity times labor utilization.  The Arabs do not 
seem to have a lot of problems with labor utilization.  They work long hours, 
but their relative productivity level is significantly low.  The Arabs work hard, 
produce relatively less output per hour, and they are poorer than the G7.  Any 
increase in the tax rate in the Arab non-oil producing countries will make them 
even poorer.  
 
Now we turn to the oil-rich and labor-scarce Arab countries.  These include 
the GCC countries plus Algeria.  The GCC effective marginal tax rate is very 
low, about 5 percent compared to Algeria, which is 34 percent.   GCC 
countries have only social security tax of about 5 percent, no income tax and 
no consumption tax.  We estimate hours-worked over two samples.  The first 
sample is when the price of oil was low, hence oil revenues to GDP were low. 
The second sample is when the price of oil was high, hence the revenues to 
GDP were high.  The theory predicts that households will increase their 
supply of labor in periods of low oil revenues and low rent. 
 
The share of hydrocarbon in GDP ω is taken from the budgets.  It is basically 
the ratio of oil and gas revenues where the superscript 
denotes hydrocarbon (oil and gas), hence is the price of the 
hydrocarbons and is the quantity.  And, the superscript denotes the non-
hydrocarbon. 
)/( nonooooo qpqpqp +
o op
oq no
   
Results of the estimates of the GCC and Algeria are shown in table 3. For 
sensitivity analysis, we use values of α  1.3 and 1.5 and also 2.0.  The 
average predicted equilibrium weekly hours-worked in the GCC is between a 
high of approximately 20 hours and a low of 13, during the sample when oil 
revenues as a share of GDP were low, which is a sensible figure compared 
with previous estimates of the G7, and Arab non-oil producing countries.  This 
average is lower than the average of the non-oil producing Arab countries.  
Algerians work slightly longer hours than the average GCC, but less than 
Bahrain.  Bahrain, Oman and the UAE predicted weekly hours-worked exceed 
the average GCC.  They also work harder than the average Arabs.  The 
citizens have higher labor participation rates and more involvements in the 
labor market than other GCC countries.  Bahrain and Oman in particular,  
implement active labor market policies to reduce unemployment and get their 
citizens to work.  Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia work relatively less hours 
than all other Arab countries, whether oil or non-oil producing.  These three 
countries are major oil and gas producers. 
 
In the second sample over the period of high hydrocarbon revenues, hours-
worked plummet just like the theory predicts.  The average falls somewhere 
between 7 and 5 hours.  Algeria's hours fall between 7 and 5 hours.  Among 
the GCC, Oman's hours-worked decline is the largest, between 12 and 8 
hours.  On average, GCC hours-worked could decline by 5 to nearly 8 hours 
due to higher hydrocarbon revenues. That says a lot about the extent of the 
rent in these economies and reflects the manifestation of the oil curse in the 
labor market.   
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We solve the model for the effective marginal tax rateτ  for the G7 and for ω in 
the GCC, i.e., the resource wedge .  Figure 1 plots the tax wedge for the G7 
and the resource wedge for the GCC.  The averages over the sample 1991-
2006 are 0.41 and 0.36 for the GCC and the G7 respectively.  The natural 
resource wedge works the same way the tax wedge works: it increases the 
wedge between real wages and the marginal product of labor, and away from 
perfect competition in the labor market.   
 
To confirm that the estimates of labor supply are highly sensitive to the tax 
rate, we report estimates with different tax rates.  In Prescott (2004) the 
marginal tax rate incssh t ττ 6.1+= , where ssτ is social security tax and incτ is the 
marginal income tax.  The number 1.6 reflects the fact that the marginal 
income tax rates are higher than the average tax rates, and the number 
delivers a marginal income tax found in Feenberg and Coutts (1993) for the 
"US". Their calculation of the marginal income tax is based on a 
representative sample of tax records.  They calculate by how much the tax 
revenue increases if every household labor income is increased by one 
percent.  The total change in tax receipts divided by the total change in labor 
income is their estimate of the marginal income tax.  We play with this 
number, and recalibrate hours for values of 1, 1.6, 2.6, and 3.6.  We prefer the 
central estimates because we believe the estimates are neither very low nor 
very high. It is inconceivable that the tax rates are above 40 percent in the 
Arab countries (see appendix 2). 
 
Our paper does not include the effect of the population dynamics.  We know 
from various empirical evidence that demographics play a major role in the 
study of labor supply.  Noland and Pack (2007) provided demographic 
statistics for the Arab countries, which show that (1) population growth 
slowing down, (2) fertility rates falling, (3) median population age is projected 
to rise, (4) female labor force participation trending up and projected to 
reaching 60 percent in many Arab countries by 2020.  The supply of labor will 
be probably increase in the future.  
 
4. Policy simulations 
 
 Diversification, consumption tax and Welfare in GCC 
 
We provide a baseline stochastic projections for hours-worked until 2050.  
Then we simulate policy scenarios. The first policy scenario is about the 
welfare effect of taxes.  We study the effect of a reduction in the share of oil in 
GDP in the GCC as a result of a policy that aims at diversifying income.   
 
We examine the effect of a permanent reduction in the share of hydrocarbon in 
GDP, ω  by an amount equal to 0.25 standard deviations.  We assume that the 
GCC countries have successfully managed to diversify their economies away 
from hydrocarbon by the year 2020, hence a permanent reduction in the share 
of oil and gas in GDP from the year 2021 to 2050 (the end of our simulation).   
The share of oil and gas revenues as we stated earlier is 
.  Diversification means a reduction in the value of )/( nonooooo qpqpqp +=ω ω  
 
 9
coming through an increase in  (the non-hydrocarbon output), thus 
higher share of labor in the production function and a lower share of natural 
resources.  The increase in labor supply increases output and consumption.   
nonoqp
 
The welfare effect of the policy is measured by the lifetime consumption 
equivalent, which is the change in real consumption required to make the 
households indifferent to the policy.   
 
We solve the model numerically over the period 2004 to 2050 using stochastic 
simulation with 10000 iterations.v  The parameters 2=α , 51.0=θ , which is the 
average value of GCC over the sample 1991-2003, ω is assumed to be a 
random walk process over the forecasting period; the error term has a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation equal to the sample value.  To simplify the 
solution of the model further we appeal to the stochastic implications of the 
lifecycle – permanent income theory of consumption and assume that the 
conditional expectations of the future marginal utility of consumption follows a 
random walk (Hall, 1978).  Working age population grows at historical trend. 
The capital stock's starting value is assumed to be twice the size of real GDP in 
1960.  The depreciation rate was assumed to be 0.05.  The value of the 
exogenous technical change A in the production function is the constant term, 
and calibrated such that the value of output in 2004 is not far away from 2003 
to make sure we have a sensible projection. 
 
Baseline level of consumption is estimated to be increasing in all GCC 
countries, but leveling off in the far future.  The consumption to output ratio 
projection depends on the projected level of output from the production 
function.  In the baseline solution, Bahrain's ratio has a negative trend 
suggesting that output is projected to increase by more than consumption.  This 
ratio rises in Kuwait, Oman, and KSA.  The most significant positive trend is in 
KSA.  The ratio is constant in the UAE.   
 
The second policy simulation introduces a 5 percent permanent value added 
tax (consumption tax cτ in the GCC on welfare, which translates to a 9.5% 
increase in the tax rateτ  (equation 5).   
 
The results of the two policy simulations are reported in table 4.  We report the 
averages of the share of hydrocarbon in GDPω ; the standard deviation ofω ; 
and the consumption to GDP ratio over the sample from 1991 to 2003. In the 
second panel, columns 5, 6 and 7 report the average projected hours-worked, 
the value of the share of hydrocarbon.  In the third panel, columns 7, 8, 9 and 
10 we report the results of the first policy, policy I.  In column 10 we quantify the 
policy of a ωσ25.0 reduction, in US dollars.  And in the last three columns we 
report the results of the second policy.  Note the jump in the labor supply under 
policy I.  The reduction in the hydrocarbon revenues is very small because we 
just wanted to show the welfare impact of a small change in policy.  The 
reduction is 0.1 on average and about 1.4 billion US dollars. This reduction in 
hydrocarbon revenues is matched by an equal reduction in government 
spending to keep the budget constraint unchanged.  We assume that the 
government can reshuffle the budget in any different way it likes.vi     
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Table 5 reports the lifetime consumption equivalent of the two policies.  Clearly, 
the welfare improvement which results from the diversification policy and 
measured in lifetime consumption equivalent is positive and sizable.  In the 
case of Oman, it is 14 percent, followed by Qatar 10.8 percent and Kuwait 9.3 
percent.  The lowest is Saudi Arabia.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a 
relatively better diversified economy than other GCC countries.  The share of 
manufacturing and agriculture in GDP are reasonably high.  The World Bank 
Development Statistics reports Saudi Arabia's agriculture, manufacturing and 
services value added in the total GDP in 2008 to be 2.3, 8 and 27.2 percent.  
Bahrain, the smallest oil producer.  Bahrain main source of income is not oil.  
Its welfare improvement from the diversification policy is equal to that of Saudi 
Arabia.  In the UAE, the welfare improvement measured by lifetime 
consumption equivalent is 5 percent, the third lowest.  The share of agriculture, 
manufacturing and services value added in 2006 reported by the World Bank 
Development Statistics are 2, 12.25 and 39.11 percent respectively.  Qatar, 
Kuwait and Oman benefit the most from diversification.  Qatar and Kuwait rely 
heavily on hydrocarbon revenues.  The Kuwaiti data are available from the 
same source for 2003 only.  The shares are 0.46, 2.27, and 48.5 percents.  We 
do not have similar data for Qatar and Bahrain. 
 
For policy II, an introduction of a permanent  5 percent VAT reduces welfare by 
around 4.6 percent in terms of lifetime consumption equivalent.  The positive 
change in the labor supply resulting from the diversification policy is larger in 
magnitude than the negative change resulting from the tax policy.  One can 
only imagine a sizable welfare effect of a policy change larger than 0.25 
standard deviation in hydrocarbon share in the economy.  The point is clear. 
Diversify and benefit. 
 
4.2 Tax policy, labor supply and poverty reduction  
 
Finally, we discuss the policy simulation pertinent to poverty reduction in the 
Arab countries.  A decrease in the tax rate or the effective marginal income 
tax rate would increase the supply of hours, GDP, and reduces poverty.  The 
policy simulation is intended to provide a feel for this policy recommendation.  
We want to answer questions such as, how long would it take to reduce or 
eliminate poverty?   
 
We choose Morocco as a case study for poverty for two reasons.  Morocco's 
poverty level is high, 21 percent of the population. And because we have some 
data on income distribution. The poverty data are based on the World Bank 
data found in POVNET for the year 2007 only and the base year for real 
expenditures is 2005.  For this reason we use data for real consumption and 
output from the Penn Table 6.3, which has data up to 2007 for Morocco and the 
base year is 2005.  
 
We solve the model over the period 1991-2006, and simulate the model 
stochastically with 10000 iterations over the period 2008 to 2040.  In the 
baseline solution, τ  the effective marginal tax rate is equal 0.39.  We set α  to 
1.78, which is the average we used earlier, and the share of capital θ  equal to 
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0.55 which is also the average over the sample.  Here too we guess that the 
capital stock's starting value is twice the size of real GDP in 1960.  The 
depreciation rate was assumed 0.05.  Consumption is assumed to be a random 
walk, with a standard normal error term of a zero mean and standard deviation 
equal to the that of the sample average from 1991-2007.  The value of the 
exogenous technical change A in the production function is the constant term, 
and calibrated such that the value of output in 2008 is not far away from 2007 
to make sure we have a sensible projection.  The policy reduces the tax rate to 
0.30 permanently.   
 
The simulated values of real consumption is used to compute poverty 
headcount. There are three parameters in the poverty function: mean real 
consumption expenditures; Gini coefficient; and the poverty line. The poverty 
line is fixed at 72 US dollar per household per month in PPP term.  The Gini 
coefficient is fixed.  The only parameter that changes is mean real consumption 
expenditure, which is updated over the simulation period.   We report the 
results in table 6.  Figure 2 plots the poverty reduction dynamics. 
 
Clearly, poverty could be reduced significantly.  As income level rises and 
growth rate of real consumption rises poverty can be cut by more than half in 
2020, i.e., in 12 years.  Poverty can be eliminated by 2050.  One can clearly 
advocate more tax reduction than the one we assumed, and cut poverty even 
faster and by more.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The work- leisure model of the labor supply has been tested extensively in the 
literature, and the majority of evidence seems to support its predictions.  This 
paper uses data from Arab countries to confirm the predictions of the model 
and add to the existing evidence yet another supporting evidence. The supply 
of labor is elastic. 
 
There are two types of Arab countries.  One consists of non oil-producing and 
labor abundant countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.  
The other includes major oil-producing and labor-scarce countries such as the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  Algeria is a major oil and gas and producer, 
but not a labor-scarce country.  While the model explains the data of the first 
group of Arab countries well, where results are comparable to the G7, the 
second group of Arab countries is more interesting because there are no 
taxes in the GCC countries.  Without taxes the model's performance and 
predictions are of limited values. To ameliorate this deficiency we introduce 
natural resource endowment effect in the work-leisure model.  We define 
effective capital as the product of physical capital and natural resource capital.  
We found that natural resources endowment acts like a tax, i.e., reduces labor 
supply. 
 
The theory we had in mind is consistent with the resource curse story.  Oil rich 
GCC countries rely heavily on their natural resources as income.  The 
government budget swells during periods of high hydrocarbon (oil and gas) 
prices, which beget rent-seeking behavior.  People spend the time looking for 
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goodies, gifts, contracts, wage subsidy…etc and eventually labor supply 
declines.  The opposite happens when hydrocarbon revenues decline and the 
budgets shrink.  People are forced to work longer hours to compensate for the 
loss in rent, and smooth out consumption.  We show that the data support 
such theory over periods of actual high and low hydrocarbon revenues. The 
supply of labor could decline by up to 7 hours a week per person during 
periods of high oil revenues.    
 
The Arab countries labor supplies are very elastic, more so in the oil-
producing countries.  An elastic labor supply could imply less interventionist 
government policies.  And as population age, transfer payments to current 
and future old generation need not be financed by increasing tax rates. It can 
open doors to social security policies that encourage savings, Prescott (2004).  
Elastic labor supplies are also good for demand policies that aims at 
increasing employment and hours.  
 
We simulate the model for scenarios under a minimum number of additional 
assumptions.   We demonstrate that a reduction in the effective marginal tax 
rate in the Arab countries can reduce poverty substantially, cut it in half in 
about 12 years in the case of Morocco.   
 
High taxes, even a 5 percent increase in the value added tax (VAT) in the oil-
rich countries would reduce welfare in terms of the lifetime consumption 
equivalent.  But most importantly we show that the resource rich countries 
increase welfare significantly from a decline in oil revenues.   To change the 
natural resource curse to a blessing the GCC is strongly advised to diversify 
its income away from oil while it can.   Our model and simple assumption 
indicate that a permanent reduction of hydrocarbon in the year 2020 could 
increase labor supply, real GDP and consumption leading to a significant 
welfare improvement. 
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Table 1:Actual and Predicted Labor Supply for the G7 and Arab non-oil Producing Countries  
)1/)(/()1(/)1( ταθθ −+−−= ych  
Estimates of the Labor Supply for the G7 (2000-2008) 
Country Actual  h Predicted Difference α  θ  τ  yc /  
Canada 25.26 23.60  1.66 1.78 0.38 0.38 0.70 
France 20.08 22.73  -2.65 1.78 0.38 0.37 0.75 
Germany 19.33 21.88  -2.54 1.78 0.38 0.42 0.73 
Italy 21.09 22.45 -1.36 1.78 0.38 0.40 0.72 
Japan 26.98 28.40 -1.41 1.78 0.38 0.25 0.66 
UK 24.05 21.30  2.75 1.78 0.38 0.38 0.80 
US 26.06 23.71  2.35 1.78 0.38 0.30 0.79 
Average  G7 23.26 23.20 0.06 1.78 0.38 0.35 0.73 
 
Estimates of the Labor Supply for the Arab Countries (1999-2006) 
 Actual Predicted 
 
Frisch 
Elasticity 
α  θ  τ  yc /  
Egypt NA 18.47 4.4 1.78 0.48 0.24 0.98 
Jordon NA 21.03 3.8 1.78 0.48 0.28 0.79 
Morocco NA     16.68 5.0 1.78 0.48 0.39 0.89 
Syria NA 26.10 2.8 1.78 0.48 0.19 0.67 
Tunisia  NA 17.11 4.8 1.78 0.48 0.35 0.92 
Average NA 19.87 4.1 1.78 0.48 0.28 0.85 
1.  Both α and θ are the average values across G7 countries.  The individual values of α for G7 which minimizes 
the error are 1.6 (Canada), 2.2 (France), 2.1 (Germany), 1.7 (Italy), 2.1 (Japan), 1.6 (UK) and 1.6 (USA) 
respectively.   Same average value of α  is adopted for the Arab countries. 
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Table 2: Productivity Decomposition of Arab Non-Oil Producing Countries 
Relative to Average G7 – Sample 1999 to 2006 
 
Hours are based on a value of 78.1=α  
Country GDP per Person GDP per Hour 
Hours per 
Person 
Egypt 15.80 21.48 73.55 
Jordan 12.73 15.17 83.89 
Morocco 15.90 23.97 66.32 
Syria 6.21 5.94 104.6 
Tunisia 22.06 32.43 68.03 
G7 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 3: Labor Supply with Natural Resource Endowment for Oil Producing 
Countries  )]1/)(/()1/[()1(ˆ ταωθωθ −+−−−−= ych N
( 29.1=α ) 
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2006 
 Nhˆ  Frisch τ  yc /  θ  ω  Nhˆ  Frisch τ  yc /  θ  ω  Difference in hours 
Algeria 20.4 3.9 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19 13.2 6.6 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.27 -12.6 
              
Bahrain 25.8 2.9 0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19 18.8 4.3 0.05 0.72 0.53 0.26 -7.0 
Kuwait 12.8 6.8 0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36 7.2 12.8 0.05 0.71 0.53 0.40 -5.6 
Oman 21.7 3.6 0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22 9.8 9.2 0.05 0.73 0.53 0.37 -11.9 
Qatar 15.4 5.5 0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33 13.1 6.6 0.05 0.42 0.53 0.39 -2.30 
KSA 16.9 4.9 0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32 7.9 11.7 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.40 -9.0 
UAE 26.0 2.8 0.05 0.63 0.49 0.23 19.6 4.1 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.27 -6.4 
Average 19.8 4.43 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 12.72 8.14 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 -7.83 
)55.1( =α  
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2006 
 Nhˆ  Frisch τ  yc /  θ  ω  Nhˆ  Frisch τ  yc /  θ  ω  Difference in hours 
Algeria 16.5 5.0 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19 10.6 8.5 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.27 -5.9 
              
Bahrain 21.2 3.7 0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19 15.2 5.6 0.05 0.72 0.53 0.26 -6.0 
Kuwait 10.2 8.8 0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36 5.7 16.5 0.05 0.71 0.53 0.40 -4.5 
Oman 17.6 4.7 0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22 7.7 11.9 0.05 0.73 0.53 0.37 -9.9 
Qatar 12.4 7.1 0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33 10.5 8.6 0.05 0.42 0.53 0.39 -1.9 
KSA  13.6 6.4 0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32 6.2 15.2 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.40 -7.4 
UAE 21.4 3.7 0.05 0.63 0.49 0.33 15.9 5.3 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.27 -5.5 
Average 16.07 5.72 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 10.19 10.51 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 -5.0 
)2( =α  
Low Hydrocarbon Revenue Period High Hydrocarbon Revenue Period 
1991-1999 2000-2006 
 Nhˆ  Frisch τ  yc /  θ  ω  Nhˆ  Frisch τ  yc /  θ  ω  Difference in hours 
Algeria 13.3 6.5 0.34 0.73 0.47 0.19 8.40 10.9 0.38 0.61 0.55 0.27 -4.9 
              
Bahrain 17.2 4.8 0.05 0.73 0.49 0.19 12.20 7.2 0.05 0.72 0.53 0.26 -5.0 
Kuwait 8.1 11.4 0.05 0.81 0.49 0.36 4.50 21.4 0.05 0.71 0.53 0.40 -3.6 
Oman 14.2 6.0 0.05 0.83 0.49 0.22 6.10 15.4 0.05 0.73 0.53 0.37 -8.1 
Qatar 9.9 9.1 0.05 0.78 0.49 0.33 8.30 11.1 0.05 0.42 0.53 0.39 -1.6 
KSA 10.9 8.2 0.05 0.74 0.49 0.32 4.90 19.5 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.40 -6.0 
UAE 17.4 4.7 0.05 0.63 0.49 0.23 12.8 6.8 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.27 -4.4 
Average 12.96 7.38 0.05 0.75 0.49 0.29 8.11 13.56 0.05 0.65 0.53 0.35 -4.8 
θ is the share of capital. τ is the effective marginal tax rate; c is consumption to GDP ratio; 
is equilibrium hours-worked predicted by the model; and 
y/
Nhˆ ω is the share of hydrocarbon 
revenues in GDP. 
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Table 4: Taxes, Natural Resources and Labor Supply Projections for GCC 
Average values 
Country Average Sample Data 
(1991-2003) 
Base Run  
(2004-2050) 
Policy I  
(2020 – 2050) 
Policy II  
(2004 – 2050) 
 
ω  ωσ  yc /  Nh  ω  yc /  Nh  ω  
ωσ25.0  
in 
million 
USD 
τ  Nh  ω  τ  
Bahrain 0.22 0.04 72.5 16.4 0.25 71.0 17.1 0.24 153.3 0.05 15.7 0.25 0.095 
Kuwait 0.38 0.07 83.7 11.4 0.35 64.3 12.5 0.33 1017.2 0.05 10.9 0.35 0.095 
Oman 0.26 0.07 79.5 7.4 0.39 73.3 8.8 0.37 839.8 0.05 7.0 0.39 0.095 
Qatar 0.37 0.07 65.7 13.4 0.36 39.2 14.8 0.35 351.7 0.05 12.8 0.36 0.095 
KSA 0.32 0.04 70.7 16.2 0.29 60.4 17.0 0.28 3812.9 0.05 15.6 0.29 0.095 
UAE 0.30 0.07 63.5 18.7 0.23 66.1 19.9 0.21 2187.5 0.05 18.0 0.23 0.095 
GCC 0.31 0.06 72.6 13.9 0.31 62.38 15.0 0.30 1393.7 0.05 13.6 0.31 0.095 
N
th is hours-worked (equation 10). ω  is the share of oil and gas (gas is converted into oil using the standard scale of 6.6). 
ωσ is the standard deviation of the natural resource revenues in GDP. 
yc / is the consumption to GDP ratio. 
τ  is the tax rate. 
Consumption and ω follow a random walk process over the simulation horizon from 2004 to 2050. 
Policy I is the diversification policy, where the GCC manages to diversify by 2020, and reduce the share of hydrocarbon by 0.25 ωσ . 
Policy II is a tax rate increase policy, where a 5% permanent increase in VAT (9.5 percent in the tax rate in equation 5). 
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Table 5: Lifetime Consumption Equivalent 
Country Policy I Policy II 
Bahrain 3.87 - 4.79 
Kuwait 9.29 - 4.80 
Oman 13.99 - 3.77 
Qatar 10.88 - 4.78 
KSA 4.21 - 4.81 
UAE 5.07 - 4.82 
-Policy I is the diversification policy, where the share of hydrocarbon in GDP 
falls by 0.25 standard deviation from 2021 to 2050. 
-Policy II is an introduction of a 5 percent permanent increase in VAT, which 
amounts to a 9.5 percent increase in the tax rate. 
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Table 6: Morocco's Poverty Reduction Policy Simulation 
 Hours GDP Per Capita 
τdy /∂
 Income Multiplier 
s
tcΔ  Poverty % 
2007 Baseline Policy Baseline Policy    21.59 i 
2008 15.99 17.97 5682.52 6014.69 -1.27 5.85 2.26 20.48 
2010 15.96 17.94 5905.58 6280.19 -1.15 6.34 2.58 18.27 
2015 15.97 17.95 6487.00 6967.58 -0.94 7.41 1.69 14.72 
2020 15.92 17.90 7076.94 7662.59 -0.81 8.28 1.20 10.50 
2025 15.93 17.91 7703.77 8395.41 -0.72 8.98 2.68 7.57 
2030 15.92 17.90 8356.12 9154.61 -0.66 9.56 1.51 5.61 
2035 15.93 17.91 9042.68 9949.86 -0.62 10.03 1.74 4.01 
2040 15.94 17.92 9767.29 10785.58 -0.58 10.43 1.37 2.92 
2045 15.93 17.91 10527.96 11659.88 -0.56 10.75 1.31 2.11 
2050 15.92 17.90 11328.41 12577.27 -0.53 11.02 1.46 1.54 
 
i Actual data 
-Data are in PPP 2005 base year.  Real PPP GDP. 
- τdy /∂  is the tax multiplier, where an increase in the tax rate reduces income. 
-  is the GDP multiplier, where the superscript denotes simulation solution  100)/( bbs yyy − s
value and denotes the baseline simulation value. 
s
b
-  is the consumption growth after policy. tcΔ
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Fugure 1: Tax Wedge and Natural resource Wedge
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Figure 2: Pro Poor Fiscal Policy, Morocco
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Appendix 1 – Data  
Average 2000-2008 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
General government final consumption expenditure, 
%GDP 19.24 23.31 18.70 19.62 17.86 20.54 15.58
Consumption of fixed capital, % GDP 13.01 13.00 14.89 15.28 20.62 11.26 11.85
Household final consumption expenditure, % GDP 55.84 56.46 58.47 59.04 57.08 64.88 70.03
Working Age Popualtion to Total Population 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67
Employment to Age working population 0.72 0.65 0.67 0.58 0.75 0.71 0.72
Taxes  individuals, % GDP 12.23 7.64 8.91 10.72 5.19 10.48 10.38
Social Security Contributions, Employees % GDP 2.01 4.02 6.11 2.30 4.28 2.64 3.00
Taxes on goods and services, % GDP 8.42 11.00 10.35 11.01 5.22 10.97 4.73
Military Expenditure, % GDP 1.20 2.46 1.38 1.92 0.97 2.46 3.76
cτ  0.16 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.09 0.19 0.07
ssτ  0.04 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.05
Capital Share 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.46 0.35 0.34 0.37
incτ  0.16 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.12
hτ  0.28 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.26 0.25τ  0.38 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.25 0.38 0.30
yc /  0.70 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.66 0.80 0.79
GDP Per Person, GDP Less IT in PPP 2005 divided 
By Population aged 15-64 42510.72 38698.09 37867.03 35733.27 40045.97 39364.55 57049.32
 
   Source: OECD 
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Data Appendix (average 1991-2006) 
Country 
Actual 
Weekly 
Worked 
Hours  
Capital 
Share 
Consumption 
Output Ratio, 
PWT 6.2 
(1991-
2003/04) 
Investment 
Ratio, PWT 
6.2 
(1991/03/04) 
Population 
(Millions) 
Labor force 
(Millions) 
Employment 
(Millions) 
Population 
Aged 15-64 
% Total 
Population 
Employment to 
Population Aged 
15-64 
Algeria   0.51 0.69 12.67 29.79 10.46 8.01 60.14 0.44 
Bahrain   0.35 0.73 9.89 0.63 0.29 0.27 68.50 0.64 
Egypt   0.45 0.96 5.41 64.91 19.24 17.35 58.89 0.45 
Kuwait   0.57 0.84 10.67 2.05 1.08 1.09 70.99 0.74 
Jordan   0.36 0.77 14.39 4.60 1.23 1.21 68.35 0.38 
Morocco   0.56 0.90 11.52 27.76 9.56 8.55 60.67 0.51 
Oman   0.53 0.80 9.30 2.29 0.82 0.76 59.81 0.55 
Qatar   0.50 0.66 18.70 0.61 0.34 0.33 73.49 0.72 
KSA   0.51 0.71 9.96 20.06 6.64 6.34 58.67 0.54 
Syria   0.33 0.73 7.79 16.06 4.73 5.09 55.11 0.57 
Tunisia   0.24 0.92 13.35 9.33 3.09 2.71 62.78 0.46 
UAE   0.61 0.63 23.12 3.04 1.75 1.72 73.98 0.75 
Source ILO UN WDI-PWT PWT WDI WDI ILO WDI ILO 
 
 
country 
Employment 
to total 
population 
Ratio 
Oil and Gas 
Reserves, 
Billions 
Barrels of 
Equivalent Oil 
GDP Per 
Capita PPP 
PWT 6.2 
(1991/03/04) cτ  ssτ  incτ  ssinc ττ +  τ  
ω Share of 
Hydrocarbon 
Revenues 
Algeria 0.27 38.0 4826.0 0.18 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.33 0.23 
Bahrain 0.44 0.8 15562.4 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.22 
Egypt 0.27 11.5 3955.0 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.24   
Kuwait 0.53 107.7 21698.5 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.32 
Jordan 0.26   3835.6 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.28   
Morocco 0.31   3630.0 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.28 0.39   
Oman 0.33 9.7 13127.0 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.20 
Qatar 0.53 113.6 23284.6 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.35 
KSA 0.31 302.4 14086.7 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.25 
Syria 0.31 4.3 1799.0 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.19 0.06 
Tunisia 0.29 0.4 6296.2 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.31 0.04 
UAE 0.56 137.8 24455.5 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.26 
Source ILO BP PWT WDI, IFS SS 
WDI, 
IFS Computed Computed WDI, IFS 
 
ILO is the International Labor Organization 
BP is British Petroleum 
PWT is Penn World Table 6.3 
WDI is World Bank 
IFS is International Financial Stats, the IMF  
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Appendix 2 – Calculating the tax rate 
 
Prescott (2004) adjusts the National Income Account to fit with economics 
theory, where households pay the taxes.  The major adjustment is to treat 
"indirect taxes less subsidy" as "net taxes on final product". It means "net 
indirect tax" is not a cost component of GDP.  Indirect taxes include value-
added taxes, sales taxes, excise taxes, property taxes…etc, which mostly 
levied on households.   Some indirect taxes such as diesel fuel taxes, 
property taxes on office buildings and sales taxes on equipments…etc fall on 
all forms of products.  It is assumed that 2/3 of the indirect taxes less subsidy 
fall directly on private consumption expenditures, and the remaining 1/3 is 
distributed evenly over private consumption and private investment.  The net 
indirect taxes on consumption, is IT
IC
CITc ]3/13/2[ ++= , where is private 
consumption expenditures,
C
I is private investment, and is net indirect taxes.   
Consumption is 
IT
cmil ITGGCc −−+= , where is public consumption and 
is military spending.  The GDP is given by 
G
milG ITGDPy −= . Prescott (2004) 
estimate of consumption tax rate is 
c
c
c ITC
IT
−=τ . Regarding tax on labor 
income, Prescott (2004) has two: the income tax with a marginal tax 
rate incτ (which we argued earlier in the paper that its estimation is highly 
controversial), and a social security tax.  The social security marginal tax rate 
))(1(
sec
ITGDP
taxesuritysocial
ss −−= θτ  , where the denominator is labor income if labor is 
paid its marginal productivity.  The average income tax rate is 
onDepreciatiITGDP
TaxesDirect
inc −−=τ , where direct taxes are paid by households and 
do not include corporate income taxes. Prescott's estimate of the marginal 
labor income tax incssh t ττ 6.1+=   and the magic number 1.6 reflects the fact 
that the marginal income tax rates are higher than the average tax rates, and 
the number delivers a marginal income tax found in Feenberg and Coutts 
(1993) for the "US". Their calculation of the marginal income tax is based on a 
representative sample of tax records.  They  calculate by how much the tax 
revenue increases if every household labor income is increased by one 
percent.  The total change in tax receipts divided by the total change in labor 
income is their estimate of the marginal income tax.
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Sensitivity Analysis of the Effective Marginal Tax Rate Calculations 
 Lower Bound 
Estimate 
 Central Estimate  Upper Bound Estimate 
Country 1τ  h   2τ  h   3τ  h   4τ  h  
Algeria 0.28 17.8  0.33 16.8  0.41 15.1  0.50 13.1
Egypt 0.20 21.5  0.24 20.6  0.31 19.1  0.38 17.5
Jordan 0.24 24.4  0.28 23.4  0.34 21.9  0.41 20.0
Morocco 0.34 19.9  0.39 18.6  0.49 16.1  0.58 13.7
Syria 0.12 30.6  0.19 28.8  0.32 25.4  0.44 21.9
Tunisia 0.30 20.3  0.35 19.2  0.43 17.2  0.51 15.1
Average 0.24 22.4  0.28 21.3  0.44 19.1  0.45 16.8
1τ corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t τ1τ = +  
2τ corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t ττ 6.1+=   
3τ corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t ττ 6.2+=  
4τ corresponds to a tax rate with incssh t ττ 6.3+=   
See definitions of the social security tax and tax on income in the 
appendix. ssτ incτ  
h )]1/(*)/()1/[()1( ταθθ −+−−= yc are hours-worked using predicting factors 
48.0=θ ;  
average Arab countries and yc / 55.1=α  
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itA
i Prescott (2004) provide evidence that – everything else constant – significant differences in 
international hours-worked almost disappear when tax rates are similar. Scandinavians pay 
relatively more taxes.  Ragan (2006) and Rogerson (2007) argued that Scandinavian 
governments subsidize market inputs into home production and provide more transfers (e.g. 
subsidized daycare) to households that supply more labor. Olovsson (2009) use home 
production data to account for the differences in hours-worked between Scandinavians and 
others.   
 
ii Lucas and Rapping (1969), Hall (1980), Andrew and Nickell (1982), Alogoskoufis (1987a, 
1987b), Dutkowsky and Dunsky (1996), Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004), and Shimer (2009) 
among many others provided evidence that support the model.  Card (1991) cited a number 
of surveys at the micro level, which seem to suggest that the intertemporal substitution 
proposition offers little explanation to labor supply decisions.  Heckman (1993) cited more 
supportive evidence. The literature is voluminous, but most cited work evidence against the 
intertemporal substitution model are, Altonji (1982), Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) 
 
iii Prescott cites a number of papers as the basis of this theory; business cycle literature 
Cooley (1995) and Cooley and Ohanian (1999); in the depression literature he cites Kehoe 
and Prescott (2002); in public finance, Christaino and Eichenbaum (1992), Baxter and King 
(1993); and in the stock market literature McGrattan and Prescott (2003) and Boldrin, 
Christian and Fisher (2001).  The labor supply is consistent with Lucas and Rapping (1969), 
Lucas (1972), Kydland and Prescott (1982), Hansen (1985) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff 
(1987). 
 
iv It is hard to imagine a process for in the Arab countries.iv  The stock of R&D stock and 
patents registered in the US are very low.  Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and the 
UAE combined registered 367 patents in the US during the period from 1980 to 2000. 
Compare that to Korea which registered 6328 patents.  Human capital stock and the quality of 
the human capital are questionable, see Development Challenges for the Arab Region: A 
Human Development Approach, UN (2009).   
 
v When solving, an approximated Jacobian is used when linearizing the model.  Then the 
approximation is updated each iteration by comparing the residuals, which result from the 
new trial value of the endogenous variables with the residuals of the linear equation.   The 
method is not significantly different from Newton, but it runs faster. The innovations to 
stochastic equations are generated by drawing a set of random numbers from a standard 
normal distribution each period.  These draws are scaled to match the variance-covariance 
system by multiplying the vector by its standard deviation because the covariance matrix is 
diagonal.   
 
vi The Penn table 6.2 data are only available to the year 2003 for the GCC countries. 
 
